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“WHEN THE ENEMY DREW OUR ATTENTION”1:
RECONSIDERING PRIOR RESTRAINT IN THE CONTEXT OF
DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN
Caine Caverly*

INTRODUCTION
Through 2016 and 2017, a team led by Canadian virologist David Evans, and
funded by an American pharmaceutical company, attempted to synthesize the previously extinct horsepox virus.2 After just six months and an expenditure of $100,000,
the research team was able to successfully construct the virus “using only commercially available information, technology and tools.”3 In January of 2018, the team
went on to publish their information in an American-based journal, PLOS ONE.4
The publication was controversial because it included a potential “blueprint” for
the synthesis of a genetic strand in the same viral family as the highly lethal, albeit
eradicated, smallpox virus.5 Though horsepox does not itself cause infection in humans,
1

In 2001, as al-Qaeda operatives fled from Kabul, a Wall Street Journal reporter acquired
access to a computer that was used by several high-ranking members in the terrorist organization. One of the documents recovered from the computer’s hard drive was a 1999 memo written
by Ayman al-Zawahiri, one of Osama bin Laden’s top lieutenants. The memo described alQaeda’s intent to pursue a biological and chemical warfare program. “The memo laments al
Qaeda’s sluggishness in realizing the menace of these weapons, noting that ‘despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by
repeatedly expressing concern that they can be produced simply.’” Alan Cullison & Andrew
Higgins, Forgotten Computer Reveals Thinking Behind Four Years of al Qaeda Doings, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2001, 2:50 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100975171479902000 [http://
perma.cc/83JV-WWDT].
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2020. BA, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
& State University, 2017. I would like to thank my parents, Tammy and Jeff, for their constant
love and support throughout all of my endeavors. I would also like to thank the staff of the
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal for its dedicated and diligent efforts in salvaging this
Note and preparing it for publication.
2
See Ryan S. Noyce et al., Construction of an Infectious Horsepox Virus Vaccine from
Chemically Synthesized DNA Fragments, 13 PLOS ONE, 1, 1–2, 13 (2018), http://journals
.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0188453 [http://perma.cc/FRT9-LSW5].
3
World Health Organization [WHO], Advisory Committee on Variola Virus Research:
Report of the Eighteenth Meeting, ¶¶ 18.1–18.2 (Nov. 2–3, 2016), http://www.who.int/csr/re
sources/publications/smallpox/18-ACVVR-Final.pdf?ua=1 [http://perma.cc/2R8U-CG6W] [hereinafter WHO Report].
4
Noyce et al., supra note 2.
5
See Tom Inglesby, Horsepox and the Need for a New Norm, More Transparency, and

171

172

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:171

some have argued that the findings presented in PLOS ONE are dangerous nonetheless because “[t]he publication of the horsepox synthesis process lowers technical
hurdles for making smallpox de novo.”6 Evans himself recognized the prospective
risks inherent in such works, noting that although he notified the proper regulatory
authorities, they “may not have fully appreciated the significance of, or potential need
for, regulation or approval of any steps or services involved in the . . . synthesi[s] and
replicat[ion] [of] a virulent horse pathogen.”7
Research such as Evans’s, which does not pose an immediate threat but could be
detrimentally misapplied for a possible bioterrorist attack, is not itself unique. This
type of research is categorized as dual use research of concern (DURC).8 The Office
of Science and Technology Policy, which advises the executive branch on the effects
of science and technology on domestic and international affairs defines DURC as:
life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can
be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information,
products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose
a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public
health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals,
the environment, materiel, or national security.9
In the case of the horsepox virus, though the intent of the research—an attempt
to craft a less toxic alternative to the smallpox vaccine10—was inherently noble, its
publication posed a potentially insidious threat to national security because of its
ability to serve as a blueprint for the synthesis of smallpox.11 The commercial availability of the research team’s materials, the relatively modest sum that was needed,
and the short amount of time in which the synthesis was concluded, all contribute
to the conclusion that replication and ill-intended expansion may not be difficult
tasks to achieve.12
Stronger Oversight for Experiments that Pose Pandemic Risks, 14 PLOS PATHOGENS, 1, 1–2
(2018), http://journals.plos.org/plospathogens/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.ppat.1007129
&type=printable [http://perma.cc/VM6V-K396].
6
Id. at 1.
7
WHO Report, supra note 3, ¶ 18.3.
8
Joel Achenbach & Lena H. Sun, Scientists Synthesize Smallpox Cousin in Ominous
Breakthrough, WASH. POST (July 7, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking
-of-science/wp/2017/07/07/scientists-synthesize-smallpox-cousin-in-ominous-breakthrough/
[http://perma.cc/27R8-CKMM].
9
OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR INSTITUTIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 3 (2014), http://www.phe
.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/durc-policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/2ZTV-RRCJ].
10
See Noyce et al., supra note 2, at 6.
11
See Inglesby, supra note 5, at 1.
12
Id.; see also WHO Report, supra note 3, ¶¶ 18.1–18.3.
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The publication of materials regarding DURC poses a difficult dilemma for
research journals. The situation often forces publishers to choose between two,
potentially antagonistic, options: help advance scientific progress through the proliferation of new information, or help ensure national security by limiting the chance
of harmful information falling into the hands of nefarious actors.13 Transparency
within the scientific community allows other researchers to build upon previous
research rather than expending unnecessary resources in an attempt to reinvent the
wheel.14 This is particularly useful in the quickly evolving field of genetic research.15
Contrarily, those whose arguments are more concerned with ensuring national security
raise worries that the potential benefits do not outweigh the great risks within the
current regulatory regime.16
Weighing these conflicting arguments invokes several different considerations:
bioethical,17 economic,18 and, most pertinent to this Note, constitutional.19 More specifically, the publishers must balance the compelling interest in ensuring national security
with freedom of the press protections afforded by the First Amendment.
The research and publication regarding the horsepox virus exemplifies this DURC
dilemma. Prior to getting published in PLOS, David Evans’s team was turned down
by two other research journals who refused to publish its findings due to the potential
complications arising from dual use research of concern.20 Furthermore, the subsequent calls for increased regulatory oversight and censorship over such research help
frame the underlying concerns and establish the timely need for guidance in this
area. This need for guidance is particularly acute regarding the constitutional concerns which necessarily follow all requests for prior restraint over the publication
of any subject matter.
Although numerous political commentators, scientists, and bioethicists have
commented on the issue of DURC and the oversight policies that are currently
13

See Brian J. Gorman, Thinkpiece Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal for Due Process Vetting, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 491, 497–98 (2005).
14
See Ana Nordberg et al., Cutting Edges and Weaving Threads in the Gene Editing
Revolution: Reconciling Scientific Progress with Legal, Ethical, and Social Concerns, 5 J.L.
& BIOSCIENCES 35, 51 (2018).
15
See id.
16
See Vickie J. Williams, The “Jurassic Park” Problem—Dual-Use Research of Concern,
Privately Funded Research and Protecting Public Health, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 361, 362 (2013).
17
See Stephen M. Maurer, End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End? Synthetic
Biology’s Stalled Security Agenda and the Prospects for Restarting It, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1387,
1394–95 (2011).
18
See Caroline R. Baskin & Todd J. Richardson, Dual Use Research Policy Implementation, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 59, 60 (2013).
19
See Williams, supra note 16, at 362.
20
Kai Kupferschmidt, How Canadian Researchers Reconstituted an Extinct Poxvirus for
$100,000 Using Mail-Order DNA, SCIENCE (July 6, 2017, 5:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag
.org/news/2017/07/how-canadian-researchers-reconstituted-extinct-poxvirus-100000-using
-mail-order-dna [http://perma.cc/3UEJ-WURY].

174

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:171

exercised over it, there has been a notable lack of discussion regarding the First
Amendment rights of the researchers. To the extent that there has been such discussion,
the constitutional arguments have largely been used as a shield against any call for
restraint placed on the publications.21 To be certain, arguments for a regime in which
the government is more inclined to censor a work, or disqualify it for publication
altogether, are hampered by the fact that courts have been remarkably hesitant to permit
prior restraint over publications in general.22 This idea is exemplified by the relatively
high success rate of journalists in Supreme Court litigation involving press regulation.23
This is not to suggest, however, that the government is never permitted to subject
a publication to increased oversight or censorship. The Supreme Court has articulated an exception in instances where national security is at stake.24 In Near v.
Minnesota,25 a seminal case in the jurisprudence of prior restraint, the Supreme
Court articulated that curtailing the First Amendment may be warranted in instances
where the nation is at war and thus subject to a unique threat of danger.26 The Court
stated that “[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual
obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”27 Since the Near decision came down
in 1931, this exception has been interpreted incredibly narrowly.28 Due to the Court’s
current hesitancy in accepting prior restraint, any calls for censorship over publications involving DURC would face an uphill battle in articulating a strong enough
justification for the restraint in terms of national security interests.
The purpose of this Note is to suggest that the courts should reevaluate the high
burden associated with the national security exception articulated in the Near
decision.29 The Court’s reasoning in that case is nearly 100 years old. Threats to
national security no longer come in the exclusive form of bullets and bombs. “In an
age of terrorism, it is not just guns, explosives, and chemical or radiologic hazards
that destabilize communities and countries; there is also the prospect of accidental
or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens.”30
21

See, e.g., Williams, supra note 16, at 372.
See Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations,
28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 439–40 (1987).
23
See ERIC B. EASTON, MOBILIZING THE PRESS: DEFENDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN
THE SUPREME COURT 183 (2012).
24
Daniel Ortner, The Terrorist’s Veto: Why the First Amendment Must Protect Provocative
Portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad, 12 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 17–18 (2016).
25
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
26
Id. at 716.
27
Id.
28
See Ortner, supra note 24, at 17–18.
29
Near, 283 U.S. 697.
30
Lawrence O. Gostin & Katharina E. Ó Cathaoir, Lurching from Complacency to Panic
in the Fight Against Dangerous Microbes: A Blueprint for a Common Secure Future, 67
EMORY L.J. 337, 339–40 (2018).
22
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As gene-editing technologies continue to evolve and become more readily available to actors who may have interests adverse to those of the State, the potential for
biowarfare on a national scale increases significantly.31 In instances such as the recent
horsepox debate, where the published materials decrease the burden of synthesizing
a deadly virus and thus increase the potential for bioweaponization, courts should
be less tentative in considering some form of prior restraint.
Part I of this Note will explore key cases involving the application of the prior
restraint doctrine. It will particularly focus on cases involving restrictions placed
against publications alleged to have threatened national security in some capacity.32
Part II will explore in more detail the dangers associated with the publication of dual
use research of concern, whether those dangers be in the form of a bioterrorist application or accidental exposure by unregulated entities.33 Part II will also apply the
courts’ reasoning discussed in Part I to an argument in favor of exploring the potential
applicability of prior restraint in the context of dual use research of concern.34
I. KEY CASES ON PRIOR RESTRAINT
Though the Near Court was careful to categorize “prior restraint” as inherently
suspect, it largely failed to establish a working and consistent definition of the term
itself.35 Nor did the Court articulate, with any sort of precision, exceptions to the
doctrine of prior restraint.36 This lack of clarity has led to a series of inconsistent
applications of the doctrine, both within the judiciary and academia.37 Though this
Note will delve deeper into the scope of the exceptions to the prior restraint doctrine,
its purpose is not to glean a common, definitional trend from precedent. As a preliminary matter, it is enough to say that “prior restraint” can be defined as a suppression
of speech before it is disseminated, a categorization which should be juxtaposed
with subsequent punishment that occurs on a post hoc basis.38 Rather than analyzing
the case law for the purpose of narrowing in on a more exact definition, a pointed
inquiry into the applicable precedent will be utilized to see how the publication of
31

Sami Ghanmi, New Biological Weapons Could Emerge from Today’s Technology: Here’s
how that Might Happen, TECH TIMES (June 20, 2018), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/23
0713/20180620/new-biological-weapons-could-emerge-from-today-s-technology-here-s-how
-that-might-happen.htm [http://perma.cc/4V58-PJY8].
32
See infra Part I.
33
See infra Section II.A.
34
See infra Section II.B.
35
See Michael I. Meyerson, Rewriting Near v. Minnesota: Creating a Complete Definition
of Prior Restraint, 52 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2001).
36
See id.
37
See id. at 1087–88.
38
See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1993); Angela Rulffes, The
First Amendment in Times of Crisis: An Analysis of Free Press Issues in Ferguson, Missouri,
68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 607, 621–22 (2018).
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dual research of concern may fit within the preexisting doctrine. By no means
exhaustive, the analysis in this Section will primarily focus on four court opinions.
A. Near v. Minnesota39
The First Amendment, which has been incorporated against the States,40 prescribes that the federal government “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . .”41 These few short words have produced many court
decisions, which have sought to define the exact scope of the aforementioned rights,
one of the most crucial of these being Near v. Minnesota.42 Though the case does not
deal directly with issues of DURC, this seminal decision does serve as a useful
starting point for determining the scope of First Amendment protections over the
publication of particularly sensitive subject material.43
In the Near case, a Minnesota statute allowed a court to enjoin an individual or
business entity from engaging in the publication of any “malicious, scandalous and
defamatory newspaper, magazine or other periodical.”44 The defendant in the case
was a publisher of The Saturday Press, a Minneapolis-based newspaper which
regularly published articles alleging that an organization of Jewish gangsters
controlled the city’s illegal activities.45 The paper also accused local law enforcement officers of being paid off by the gang.46 The Minnesota Supreme Court first
found that the statute was constitutionally valid, arguing that the Constitution does
not afford protection over publications that were “devoted to scandal and defamation.”47 The court went on to articulate that the publications the defendant was
engaged in were in violation of that statute.48
In a 5–4 decision, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, in his majority opinion,
reversed the decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court.49 Justice Hughes focused on
the distinction between prior restraint and the punishment that could follow allegations of libel.50 Quoting Blackstone, Hughes laid out the principle that:
[t]he liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon
39

283 U.S. 697 (1931).
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
41
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42
See NAT HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM: THE TUMULTUOUS HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH
IN AMERICA 187 (1980).
43
See EASTON, supra note 23, at 60–61.
44
Near, 283 U.S. at 702.
45
HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 188.
46
Id.
47
State ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 219 N.W. 770, 770 (Minn. 1928).
48
Id. at 773.
49
Near, 283 U.S. at 722–23.
50
Id. at 713–15.
40
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publications . . . . Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay
what sentiments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to
destroy the freedom of the press . . . .51
The Court found that prior restraint poses a peculiarly troublesome threat to
First Amendment protections since the dissemination of information allows public
discourse over the truthfulness or importance of particular statements. In other
words, prior restraint does not permit these statements to ever enter into the public
sphere.52 If the published statements are later found to be libelous or defamatory in
some meaningful way, adequate remedies exist in a subsequent punishment context.53
The Court did, however, indicate that the freedom of the press is not absolute.54
Chief Justice Hughes articulates four potential exceptions to the rule against prior
restraint.55 Pertinent to this Note, Hughes articulates an exception for situations in
which the nation is at war, opining that “[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”56 Ultimately,
the Court found that the Minnesota statute did not fall into any of these narrow
exceptions, and, accordingly, the judgment of the Minnesota Supreme Court was
reversed in favor of the defendant-publisher.57
B. New York Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers Case)58
Forty years after the Near decision, the Supreme Court once again revisited the
issue of prior restraint on publication.59 In New York Times Co. v. United States,
perhaps more readily known as the Pentagon Papers Case, the Court was forced to
determine the constitutionality of injunctions placed on the publication of a classified Department of Defense (DoD) study in two major newspapers.60 The study,
entitled “History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy,” was leaked
by one of its DoD authors to both the New York Times and the Washington Post.61
51

Id. at 713–14 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52).
Id. at 719–20.
53
Id. at 720.
54
Id. at 716.
55
See Meyerson, supra note 35, at 1091–92. In a broad sense, the four exceptions that
Chief Justice Hughes articulates are: (1) cases involving national security; (2) publications
of obscenities; (3) incitements of violence; and (4) situations where it is necessary to protect
private rights according to equitable principles. See id. at 1106.
56
Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
57
Id. at 722–23.
58
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
59
Id. at 714.
60
See JOE MATHEWSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESS: THE INDISPENSABLE
CONFLICT 34 (2011).
61
Id.
52
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The newspapers, after considering the implications of the study, began printing
excerpts from what began to be called the Pentagon Papers.62
The United States sought to enjoin future publication of the study, arguing that its
dissemination posed a serious threat to national security, and that accordingly, the Executive branch was constitutionally permitted to take action to protect the safety of the
country.63 The district courts refused to enjoin the publishers, finding that the government had not met its heavy burden in demonstrating the need for prior restraint.64
In a 6–3 per curiam opinion, with each of the nine justices adding their own concurring or dissenting opinions, the Court affirmed the decision of the district courts.65
Though the opinions differed in their interpretations of prior restraint and the case
at bar, the per curiam opinion recognized that with prior restraint, there came “a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”66
In his concurring opinion, Justice White writes: “I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment permit an injunction against publishing information about government plans or operations.”67 The Justice goes on to recognize
that there may be instances, even in the case of the Pentagon Papers, where publication
will likely lead to “substantial damage to public interests.”68 Nevertheless, Justice
White found that the government had not met the high burden necessary to justify prior
restraint being placed on the publication of this information.69 Though the concurring
opinion fails to include a defined articulation of what the government would need to
show in order to justify an injunction against publication, it does suggest that the Court
may be more inclined to uphold instances of prior restraint if Congress were to designate certain types of publications that posed a particular threat to national security.70
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, largely echoes the same idea that a
free and robust press permitted to publish without impediment is key to an enlightened citizenry.71 The concurrence suggests that although the publication of certain
sensitive information could be incredibly detrimental to national security, there are
adequate remedies to the situation in the form of criminal laws that would permit
subsequent punishment in the applicable circumstances.72 Justice Stewart concludes
his opinion by suggesting, perhaps inadvertently, a standard in which to determine
when the national security exception articulated in Near can come into play.73 He
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 717–18 (Black, J., concurring).
Id. at 714 (per curiam).
See id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
See id. at 732–33.
See id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id. at 730.
See id.
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suggests that the government may have been successful if it were able to show that
the publication of the sensitive information would lead to “direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”74
C. United States v. Featherston75
Following on the heels of the New York Times Co. decision, the Fifth Circuit,
in 1972, affirmed the convictions of two leaders of the Black Afro Militant Movement
(BAMM) who provided instructions to the group’s members on how to craft incendiary and explosive devices.76 The court found that the group had violated 18 U.S.C.
§ 231(a)(1),77 which criminalized the act of teaching another to create explosives or
firearms with the knowledge that that information would be used in the furtherance
of a civil disturbance.78
The court, on the grounds that the dissemination of such information was a
“clear and present danger” to society, as that standard was articulated in Dennis v.
United States,79 upheld the convictions of the defendants.80 As one scholar explained, “[w]hile the basis for the court’s rejection of [defendants’] First Amendment [argument] is not crystal clear, the court appears to distinguish between
protected ‘advocacy’ and specific instructions on how to commit crimes.”81 Thus,
74

Id.
461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
76
Id. at 1121, 1123.
77
This statute provides:
Whoever teaches or demonstrates to any other person the use, application, or making of any firearm or explosive or incendiary device, or
technique capable of causing injury or death to persons, knowing or
having reason to know or intending that the same will be unlawfully
employed for use in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder which may in
any way or degree obstruct, delay, or adversely affect commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce or the conduct or
performance of any federally protected function . . . [s]hall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1994).
78
Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1121.
79
341 U.S. 494 (1951). The Dennis Court was concerned with potential threats to the
United States that were internal in nature, as opposed to external invasions or attacks. See
id. at 509. In articulating what the phrase “clear and present danger” meant, the Court stated:
“[T]he words cannot mean that before the Government may act, it must wait until the putsch
is about to be executed . . . .” Id. But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
Brandenburg established the “incitement to lawless action” standard, which moves away
from the “clear and present danger’ doctrine on which Dennis purported to rely.” See id. at
448–49; id. at 449–50 (Black, J., concurring).
80
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Details: Specific Facts and the First Amendment, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 17 (2012).
81
Id.
75
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the dangerousness of the defendants’ convictions was apparently evidenced by the
movement’s professed plans for the “coming revolution” in addition to the idea that
the instructions themselves contained potentially endangering information.82
D. United States v. Progressive, Inc.83
In 1979, the Department of Justice brought suit under the Atomic Energy Act84
against The Progressive, a Wisconsin-based magazine in order to enjoin them from
publishing an article entitled, “The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re
Telling It.”85 The article allegedly included information, some already within the
public domain and some not, which explained how a hydrogen bomb is designed
and how it functions.86 The government argued that “its national security interest . . .
permits it to impress . . . censorship upon information originating in the public
domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information acquires
the character of presenting immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests
of the United States.”87
While recognizing that any prior restraint on publication comes into court with
a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, the court nevertheless found
that the article in this case fell into the narrowly defined national security exception
that was articulated in Near.88 In discussing the potentially harmful nature of the
publication in question, the opinion states: “What is involved here is information
dealing with the most destructive weapon in the history of mankind, information of
sufficient destructive potential to nullify the right to free speech and to endanger the
right to life itself.”89
After balancing the need for free speech protections and national security concerns, the court found that the risk involved in the unbridled publication of such
sensitive information was simply too important.90 The opinion stated that it was better
to err on the side of caution, for the proliferation of such information “could pave
the way for thermonuclear annihilation . . . .”91 If such destruction were to occur, “our
right to life [would be] extinguished and the right to publish [would become] moot.”92
The court ultimately imposed a temporary restraining order on the defendant, marking
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

See Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1122–23.
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
42 U.S.C. § 2280 (2012).
HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 213.
See id. at 213–14.
Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 991.
Id. at 992–93, 996.
Id. at 995.
See id. at 996.
Id.
Id.
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the first time in American history that a preliminary injunction was granted against
press publication.93
Perhaps more elucidating than the order itself is the manner in which the court
rationalized its decision against the defendant’s arguments. The Progressive raised
several points in relation to the precedent which seemed to be clearly in their favor.94
Essentially, the defendant argued two main, interrelated points: (1) the publication
in question was the product of information already in the public domain,95 and (2)
the idea that the publication would lead to grave and irreparable harm, as articulated
in New York Times Co., was too attenuated, especially when considering the fact that
the nation was not currently at war.96
In response to the first argument raised, the court and the government conceded
that some of the information presented in the proposed publication was indeed available in the public sphere.97 But the court went on to state that “[e]ven if some of the
information is in the public domain, due recognition must be given to the human
skills and expertise involved in writing this article. The author needed sufficient
expertise to recognize relevant, as opposed to irrelevant, information and to assimilate the information obtained.”98 Stated differently, the court reasoned that the author
was only able to produce the article due to his individual skill; after applying this
expertise in the collection and compilation of his findings, the author then made the
knowledge far more accessible to those without the otherwise requisite skill that was
needed.99 The opinion states that even though the publication includes information
available to the public, and even though the publication would most likely not serve
as a “do-it-yourself” guide to hydrogen bomb crafting, the dissemination of this
information could “provide a ticket to by-pass blind alleys.”100
With regards to the defendant’s second argument, the court disagreed with The
Progressive, finding that there is indeed a threat of grave and irreparable harm associated with the publication of this information.101 Throughout the opinion, the court
restates the proposition that annihilation in the form of a hydrogen bomb is one of
the gravest threats posed against the country.102 The court distinguishes this case
from New York Times Co. because the publication at issue there contained historical
data that may simply cause some embarrassment to the United States, rather than an
imminent threat to national security.103 In addressing the Near exception for national
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 214–15.
Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 994.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 991–93.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 995–96.
See id.
Id. at 994.
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security, the court opines that the nature of war and national security threats have
changed since the 1930s.104 “Now war by foot soldiers has been replaced in large
part by war by machines and bombs. No longer need there be any advance warning
or any preparation time before a nuclear war could be commenced.”105
No higher court was able to review the decision as the case did not proceed past
the Western District Court of Wisconsin.106 This is due to the fact that three days after
the case was argued to the Seventh Circuit, another magazine published essentially
the same potentially jeopardizing information that the government was trying to
restrain The Progressive from publishing.107 The only difference between this new
publication and the Progressive article was that the published piece included more
information regarding the specific operation of the fusion weapons themselves.108
II. PROPOSAL FOR INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF PRIOR RESTRAINT
IN THE CONTEXT OF DURC
Although there has been a clear interest in addressing the issue of DURC and its
publication, little consensus on what should actually be done has thus far emerged.109
One source of apparent agreement amongst those within and outside of the scientific
community, however, is that restraints on DURC publication would most assuredly
be struck down as unconstitutional.110 To be clear, however, this is currently little
more than an assumption, as no court has ever addressed the constitutionality of
different restrictions on DURC or DURC publication.111 But in an area of such grave
concern—which poses a problem with no immediately apparent solution—why
should some form of publication restriction be deemed inherently unlawful without
ever looking to its potential merits?
From a policy perspective, outside the realm of constitutional debates, arguments
raised in opposition to expanded DURC oversight and calls for increased safeguards
104

Id. at 996.
Id.
106
See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293, 1349 (2007).
107
Id.
108
Id. (“[T]he government ‘conceded that the secret was indeed out’ and ‘announced that
it was abandoning its case.’ In other words, the government’s case that [the Progressive author’s]
article posed a danger to national security was mooted by the disclosure of information contained nowhere within his work.”).
109
See Williams, supra note 16, at 371 (“Numerous articles appeared in the popular media
about . . . the controversy, and the scientific literature abounded with commentary and opinions . . . about the proper balance between the free flow of scientific information, national
security and public health and safety. Although the debate has been robust, little consensus
has emerged.”).
110
See, e.g., id.
111
See Vickie J. Williams, Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, Public Health
and Safety, and the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 81, 83 (2013).
105
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in the publication process have expressed the need to ensure transparency in the
community and to guarantee a robustly free system of publication.112 Even proponents of a new regulatory regime have been careful to avoid suggestions of outright
prior restraint due to the presumption of unconstitutionality articulated by the Supreme Court.113 But should this presumption completely invalidate an option that
may be more effective in addressing the publication of DURC than the system currently in place?
This Note does not suggest that prior restraints on publication should be more
willingly pursued by the government and upheld by the courts in all instances. It
does not even necessarily suggest that such censorship would be the most effective
way of addressing the national security concerns that arise from the publication of
dual use research of concern. Rather, it simply suggests, by way of an examination
of the DURC dilemma, that as threats to national security change, so should our
constitutional response. The world is not the same as it was in 1931 when the Supreme Court decided Near v. Minnesota and established a national security exception
where prior restraints could be viewed more favorably by the courts.114 And as the
world has changed, so have the national security threats which exist therein.
This Part of the Note will first briefly discuss the potential danger posed by the
publication of dual use research of concern and its relation to national security
concerns. Secondly, this Part will address how a potential restraint on DURC
publication would fit within the general prior restraint framework discussed in Part
I. After exploring some of the holdings of the cases discussed above, this Note seeks
to demonstrate that although prior restraints have generally been frowned upon by
the courts, there is some precedent to suggest that an imposition of such restraint on
DURC publications may withstand constitutional scrutiny.
A. DURC: A Modern Threat to National Security
The threat involved in DURC publication is multifaceted: it involves a threat of
bioterrorist application, accidental release by the researchers conducting the studies,
or accidental exposure by those who may attempt to replicate the published DURC
experiments in settings that may not be subject to strenuous oversight policies.115
112

See Christian Enemark, Influenza Virus Research and EU Export Regulations: Publication, Proliferation, and Pandemic Risks, 25 MED. L. REV. 293, 304 (2017).
113
See, e.g., Brian J. Gorman, Balancing National Security and Open Science: A Proposal
for Due Process Vetting, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 491, 500 (2005) (describing prior restraint as a
“loathsome option”); Williams, supra note 111, at 106–07.
114
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
115
See Heidi Ledford, Life Hackers: Amateur Hobbyists Are Creating Home-Brew
Molecular-Biology Labs, but Can They Ferment a Revolution?, 467 NATURE 650, 650–51
(2010), http://www.nature.com/news/2010/101006/pdf/467650a.pdf [http://perma.cc/U29M
-F8AB]; Jonathan E. Suk et al., Dual-Use Research and Technological Diffusion: Reconsidering
the Bioterrorism Threat Spectrum, 7 PLOS PATHOGENS, 1, 1 (2011), http://journals.plos.org
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Though the CDC does not currently anticipate any immediate or direct bioterrorist
threat,116 the potential for extensive harm remains. One grim assessment of the
dangers associated with smallpox stated:
[I]f obtained and intentionally released, smallpox could cause a
public health catastrophe because of its communicability. Even
a single case could lead to 10 to 20 others. It is estimated that no
more than 20% of the population has any immunity from prior
vaccination. There is no acceptable treatment, and the communicability by aerosol requires negative-pressure isolation. Therefore, these limited isolation resources in medical facilities would
be easily overwhelmed.117
In 2012, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
explored the threat of dual use research of concern.118 It sought to balance the competing interests of the free exchange of scientific information and the necessity of
ensuring national security.119 Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) made it clear that the
threats of dual use research are real and increasingly prevalent in the modernizing
world: “These are not hypothetical threats. Before he was killed, Anwar al-Awlaki
[Yemeni-American al-Qaeda propagandist] reportedly sought poisons to attack the
United States. Adding to these concerns, the new leader of al-Qaeda has a medical
background. Therefore, he may have an even greater interest in pursuing chemical and
biological terrorism.”120 Senator Joe Lieberman (D-CT) concluded the hearing by recognizing that while the government had a policy in place, there was a continued need
to review U.S. policies addressing the problems associated with DURC publication.121
/plospathogens/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.ppat.1001253&type=printable [http://perma.cc
/SQ78-TQCY]; James G. Vanzant, Dangerous Minds: Controlling the Publication of Biological Research, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE (2010), http://harvardlpr.com/online-ar
ticles/dangerous-minds-controlling-the-publication-of-biological-research/ [http://perma.cc
/2CHG-ANDU].
116
For a general overview of CDC bioterrorism procedures, see Emergency Preparedness
and Response, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://emergency.cdc.gov/bioter
rorism/index.asp [http://perma.cc/V8NQ-KJBB].
117
Mark G. Kortepeter & Gerald W. Parker, Potential Biological Weapons Threats, 5
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 523, 526 (1999).
118
For a full reading of the reports, see Biological Security: The Risk of Dual-Use Research:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012).
119
Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Joseph I. Liberman) (“Those are difficult questions to balance,
and again, I repeat that we ask them here in this Committee because of the direct connection
between the scientific work and the homeland security of the American people, which it is
our first responsibility to protect.”).
120
Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
121
See id. at 28 (“[W]e want the benefits of scientific inquiry. . . . We also need to mitigate
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Of particular concern today are the advancements being made in the field of genetic
engineering and manipulation, namely with regards to developments in CRISPRCas9 technologies.122 CRISPR, an acronym for “Clustered, Regularly Interspaced,
Short Palindromic Repeats,” is, in relatively simplistic terms, a gene editing process
that implements “RNA guided nucleases to make site specific double strand breaks in
the genome for the purpose of inactivating genes, modifying mutations, or inserting
intact genes.”123 Essentially, CRISPR allows for the manipulation of genetic strands
in a manner that is uniquely cost-effective and precise.124
The relative availability and precision of this new gene-editing tool has sparked
immense interest—and fear—from large segments of the population who, while
recognizing its potential for novel advancements in medicine, are concerned with
CRISPR’s dual use threat.125 Due to the rapid acceptance of this new technology and
its broad availability, concerns regarding the potential hazards of CRISPR have not
been adequately addressed by either lawmakers or the scientific community itself.126
This lack of adequate legislative oversight leaves numerous threats unaddressed,
particularly that of bioterrorist application.127 “CRISPR’s ease of use . . . means that
dangerous outcomes can result . . . . Pathogens could be engineered for biological
attacks . . . against humans or against the food supply with devastating effects. . . .
The problem is always one of uncertain risks at the beginning of the spread of new
tools like this.”128
Speaking in a sense broader than CRISPR-related threats, it is difficult to quantify the impact or likelihood of any potential bioterrorist attack (and more specifically,
risk, and I think the policy that we have now is clearly aimed at doing exactly that. So we will
follow it to see how it is going. Maybe we will come back again and do [another] hearing. . . .”).
122
John Lauerman, Gene Editing, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2018), http://www.washington
post.com/business/gene-editing/2018/11/26/af0354c6-f1a1-11e8-99c2-cfca6fcf610c_story
.html?utm_term=.fbd09babf37b [http://perma.cc/NF7U-XVNH].
123
Katherine Drabiak, Untangling the Promises of Human Genome Editing, 46 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 991, 991 (2018).
124
See Joel Achenbach, A New CRISPR Breakthrough Could Lead to Simpler, Cheaper
Disease Diagnosis, WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speak
ing-of-science/wp/2017/04/13/a-new-crispr-breakthrough-could-lead-to-simpler-cheaper-dis
ease-diagnosis/?utm_term=.32952e0209c1 [http://perma.cc/2B3A-NP8B].
125
See, e.g., Marc A. Thiessen, Gene Editing Is Here. It’s an Enormous Threat, WASH. POST
(Nov. 29, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/gene-editing-is-here-its-an-enor
mous-threat/2018/11/29/78190c96-f401-11e8-bc79-68604ed88993_story.html?utm_term
=.fb4be4409284 [http://perma.cc/7P8Q-Q6UY] (“Playing with humanity’s genetic code could
open a Pandora’s box. Scientists will eventually be able to alter DNA not just to protect against
disease but also to create genetically enhanced human beings. . . . This would have profound
societal implications.”).
126
See Barry R. Furrow, The CRISPR-Cas9 Tool of Gene Editing: Cheaper, Faster, Riskier?,
26 ANN. HEALTH L. 33, 37–38 (2017).
127
See id. at 38–42.
128
Id. at 39–40.
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the threat associated with the publication of DURC-related information).129 The risks
inherent in the situation, however, could contribute to a compelling enough government interest in the form of ensuring national security.
B. DURC’s Place in Prior Restraint Precedent
Though precedent clearly establishes that any prior restraints placed on publication are immediately viewed by the courts as suspect, courts have allowed prior
restraints on publications to preserve national security.130 This Section will explore
how the issues involving DURC publication fit within a general framework of prior
restraint jurisprudence. It will also further attempt to demonstrate that the DURC
issue is distinguished from the situations involved in the precedential Supreme Court
cases of Near v. Minnesota131 and New York Times Co.132
By addressing the potential dangers involved in the publication of dual use
research of concern, it will become evident that the DURC dilemma’s threat to
national security may bring the issue into the realm of a Near exception. Ultimately
the problems associated with the publication of this sensitive information make the
situation more akin to cases like United States v. Progressive133 and United States
v. Featherston.134
1. Applying the DURC Issue to Near v. Minnesota
As one of the first cases that the Supreme Court heard regarding prior restraint,
Near v. Minnesota established the enduring precedent that prior restraints on publication
should be viewed as immediately suspect.135 In Near, Justice Hughes wrote that in order
to avoid the problems associated with an overly burdensome and restrictive system of
publication that plagued Great Britain, the Founding Fathers were careful to ensure
broad protections for free speech.136 Hughes wrote: “In determining the extent of the
129

When it is difficult to objectively assess the risks of different options and situations, the
precautionary principle encourages one to consider the worst possible outcomes of different
choices and make the choice that avoids them. See David B. Resnik, H5N1 Avian Flu Research
and the Ethics of Knowledge, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22, 28 (2013) (“Although we cannot
quantify the risks [of publishing DURC-related findings], the threats are plausible and serious.
The precautionary principle would instruct us to take reasonable measures to avoid, minimize,
or mitigate those risks.”).
130
See discussion supra Part I.
131
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
132
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
133
467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979).
134
461 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972).
135
See Richard Favata, Note, Filling the Void in First Amendment Jurisprudence: Is There
a Solution for Replacing the Impotent System of Prior Restraints?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 169,
172, 175 (2003).
136
Near, 283 U.S. at 713–14.
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constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it
is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication.”137 But the opinion does not stop there. The Court carefully articulated exceptions to the general rule, writing that “[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of
the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”138
Important to this Note, the exception regarding the sailing dates of transports
and the location of troops has historically been interpreted to be a somewhat broader
exception for ensuring national security in general.139 Though the Supreme Court
has never articulated the exact parameters of the national security exception, it has
the possibility, at least in a theoretical sense, of reaching situations in which the
publication of particularly sensitive information could lead to catastrophic effects
on national well-being.140 Thus, a prior restraint placed on dual use research of
concern may at least have the possibility of being shoehorned into the national
security exception articulated in Near.
It is also important to draw parallels specifically between the issue at hand in
Near (not just the exceptions articulated) and the issues surrounding DURC. The
state statute at issue in Near did not seek to address matters of national security.141
It was instead aimed at stamping out obscenities and potentially scandalous or
defamatory publications.142 Perhaps the Supreme Court took such a strong stance in
opposition to prior restraint simply because of the issue that was before them at that
very moment. Besides its belief that the United States has historically and unequivocally relied on the presumption that prior restraints on publication are an inherent
evil, the Court also justified its decision to strike down the state statute based on two
other principles.143 Firstly, the Court argued that if a party was adversely affected by
the scandalous and defamatory publications that the state attempted to stamp out,
said party would have a way to get redress post-publication, namely through state
libel laws.144 Secondly, the Court appears to suggest that in cases of defamatory and
137

Id. at 713.
Id. at 716.
139
Roger W. Pincus, Press Access to Military Operations: Grenada and the Need for a New
Analytical Framework, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 813, 818–19 (1987); Sonja West, When the President
Stopped the Presses, CNN (Nov. 21, 2017, 10:45 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/21
/opinions/information-leak-cases-opinion-west/index.html [http://perma.cc/BVQ3-J9GB].
140
See Pincus, supra note 139, at 819. Because the courts have generally not addressed
the national security exception in great detail, it is possible that it may only apply in times of
war. See id. This idea, however, is refuted, at least in some sense, by the exception’s application in Progressive. See infra Section II.B.4.
141
See Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording Police
Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273, 303 (2012).
142
See id.; see also Near, 283 U.S. at 701–02.
143
See Near, 283 U.S. at 719–22.
144
See id. at 719–20 (“The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from previous
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obscene remarks, the most effective manner of addressing these problems may be
within a marketplace of free ideas, for any impediment to such a system of free
speech would be more detrimental than the defamatory or potentially inflammatory
remarks themselves.145
Taken in turn, it is not immediately apparent that these two justifications would
also correspond with restrictions placed on dual use publication, or any other matters
involving potential threats to national security. With regards to the Court’s first
justification, there may indeed be a system of subsequent punishments in place for
the publication of potential threats to national security.146 However, these subsequent
punishments do not effectively cover what occurs with DURC publications. The
jurisprudence in this field of law, specifically with respect to the Espionage Act,147
has historically involved instances where a government agent has disclosed sensitive
and confidential information to another person, rather than delivering it to the press
for publication.148
A journal that publishes the findings of an experiment involving dual use research
of concern would most assuredly never be prosecuted under any such statutes. For
one, the information that would be published, although sensitive, would not be considered classified government materials. Furthermore, there is even some question as
to whether different publishers could ever be prosecuted under the current statutory
regimes.149 It is possible that prosecution under these legislative acts can only be pursued against the government agents who disseminated the sensitive information in
the first place, and not the publishers or, more importantly in the context of DURC, the
non-governmental scientists conducting the research in the first place.150 Ultimately,
unlike the state libel laws in Near v. Minnesota, there is no system of subsequent
punishment in place for the proliferation of dual use research that may lead to later
catastrophic events.
The second principle that the Court in Near seems to rely on to justify its condemnation of prior restraint is the idea that the most effective way of combatting
restraint in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may
exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privilege.”).
145
See id. at 721–22.
146
See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National
Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 262–77 (2008) (describing the current statutory regime
that addresses the publication of information that poses a threat to national security, including:
the Espionage Act, the Atomic Energy Act, and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act).
147
See generally Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 792–99 (2012)).
148
See generally Papandrea, supra note 146.
149
See id. at 282.
150
See id. at 283 (“Whatever the scope of the government’s power to restrict the First Amendment rights of its employees, the Court has been very explicit that a different First Amendment analysis applies to persons who have not voluntarily accepted a position of trust and a
duty of confidentiality. Any prosecution against someone without a trust relationship with
the government, therefore, must satisfy rigorous First Amendment standards.”).
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certain ill-effects of publishing information is to have a system of robust public
discussion.151 The concept behind this marketplace of ideas is that the public should
be presented with all possible expressions to then consume the most credible source
of information.152 The Supreme Court in Near opined that the effects of an impeded
marketplace of ideas, especially a robustly open marketplace of ideas, would be far
more detrimental than the effects of a scandalous publication.153 But in the case of
DURC publications, the potential harms associated with it are far greater than the
harms associated with the publication of scandalous or defamatory articles.154
2. Applying the DURC Issue to New York Times Co.
The Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. helped further elaborate on what
the national security exception in Near did and did not cover.155 This case involved
a situation in which The New York Times and The Washington Post both engaged
in a publication campaign in which they gradually released excerpts of the Pentagon
Papers.156 The Pentagon Papers, which were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, a former
military analyst, contained a voluminous history of the United States’ involvement
in Southeast Asia that was commissioned by Robert MacNamara in 1967.157
Important to the case’s relevance to the DURC discussion, this particular history
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the surrounding Southeast countries was just
that, a history.158 The Pentagon Papers, at least as the Supreme Court viewed it, did
not include any information that could potentially have an impact on future endangerments of national security.159 Rather, the Pentagon Papers merely demonstrated
that individuals “at the highest levels of the [American] government . . . [had]
deliberately deceived the American people” regarding the country’s position and
decision-making strategy in the Vietnam War.160
151

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 721–22 (1931).
Jill Gordon, John Stuart Mill and the “Marketplace of Ideas,” 23 SOC. THEORY &
PRAC. 235, 236 (1997).
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Near, 283 U.S. at 722.
154
See supra Section II.A.
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See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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See Niraj Chokshi, Behind the Race to Publish the Top-Secret Pentagon Papers, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 20, 2017), http://nyti.ms/2DgpAd4.
157
LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A NEW
CENTURY 21 (2010).
158
See HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 192.
159
See BOLLINGER, supra note 157, at 21–22.
160
HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 192. The Pentagon Papers showed that President Johnson
was making efforts to commit more troops to Vietnam, while at the same time condemning
his political opponent, Barry Goldwater, for “want[ing] to escalate the war.” Id. The Papers also
showed instances where leaders of the State and Defense Departments made public announcements that victory in Vietnam was imminent, while privately knowing that the end was nowhere
in sight. Id.
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Nevertheless, the government, in an attempt to enjoin the newspapers from
publishing further excerpts from the document, argued that prior restraint should be
permitted in this instance because national security would indeed be jeopardized by
further dissemination of the information.161 The government argued that by allowing
the publication of such sensitive information, the Court would endanger the lives of
American prisoners in Vietnam and would weaken the country’s ability to engage
in foreign policy.162 But, the Court disagreed, finding that the government had not
met its burden to show that such a historical account of United States’ involvement
would have a substantial enough effect on national security to invoke the Near exception for allowing prior restraints on publication.163
The issues involving the publication of dual use research of concern can be
distinguished from the subject matter at question in New York Times Co.164 There,
the information being published was historical,165 and the government was accordingly unable to demonstrate any semblance of evidence that the publication posed
a significant threat to national security, at least not to the extent that the Court felt
comfortable in chilling the press’s First Amendment protections.166 As demonstrated
earlier in this Note, the publication of novel dual use research is not merely a summary
of past events—instead, it is a potential blueprint for future, nefarious purposes.167
Dual use research of concern should thus be interpreted more in line with the Near
Court’s articulation of threats to the traditional sanctity of the American military.168
Although the Court in New York Times Co. reaffirmed the idea expressed in Near
v. Minnesota that prior restraints are viewed with a presumption of invalidity,169 a
161

N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
HENTOFF, supra note 42, at 192–93. The government took the position that “other nations
would no longer trust the ability of the [United States’] leaders to maintain the total confidentiality” required in diplomatic dealings. Id.
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N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 713–14 (per curiam); see also id. at 729–30 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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See infra notes 164–67 and accompanying text.
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N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 722 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“I had gone over the
material listed in the in camera brief of the United States. It is all history, not future events.”).
166
Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“Even if the present world situation were assumed to
be tantamount to a time of war, or if the power of presently available armaments would justify
even in peacetime the suppression of information that would set in motion a nuclear holocaust,
in neither of these actions has the Government presented or even alleged that publication of items
from or based upon the material at issue would cause the happening of an event of that nature.”).
167
See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text; see also Environmental Health and
Safety: Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC), U. MD. BALT., http://www.umaryland.edu
/ehs/programs/biosafety/dual-use-research-of-concern-durc/ [http://perma.cc/TE8A-XFKJ]
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
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Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that a
government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”).
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N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (per curiam) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
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majority of the justices were careful to articulate that the unjustifiability of prior restraints is not absolute.170 For instance, Justice Stevens did not disclose the possibility
of prior restraints being placed on the publication of information that could “inevitably, directly, and immediately” lead to a threat to national security.171 As this language appeared in just two of the concurring opinions, the Court did not articulate
a proper scope of a national security exception and much less the scope of these
three adjectives.172
If these words were to be taken at face value, it would appear that any publication, no matter how sensitive and potentially detrimental to national security, would
not lead to an inevitable and immediate imperilment to the security of the country.173
Even the publication of troop locations, specifically set aside as an exception in
Near, would not necessarily lead to an inevitable, direct, and immediate cataclysm.174 Surely, there must be some sort of leeway in determining a publication’s
threat to national security, for to take the Court’s phraseology literally would render
the exception articulated in Near moot.175
170

See id. at 722 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“We need not decide therefore what leveling
effect the war power of Congress might have [on the government’s ability to restrict the freedom
of the press here, because this case arises from a war authorized by the president and not
Congress].”); id. at 724–25 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]ur judgments in the present cases may
not be taken to indicate the propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining
orders to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by the Government.”); id. at
730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I am convinced that the Executive is correct with respect to some
of the documents involved[,] [b]ut I cannot say that disclosure of any of them will surely result
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”); id. at 731 (White, J.,
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damaging to ‘national security,’ however that term may be defined.”); id. at 749 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he First Amendment right itself is not an absolute . . . .”); id. at 757 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he judiciary may properly insist that the determination that disclosure of the subject matter would irreparably impair the national security . . . .”); id. at 761 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“First Amendment absolutism has never commanded a majority of this Court.”).
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See id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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See id.; id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (leaving open the possibility of allowing prior
restraints for information that “will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage
to our Nation and its people”).
173
See infra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
174
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
175
Alberto Bernabe-Riefkohl, Prior Restraints on the Media and the Right to a Fair Trial:
A Proposal for a New Standard, 84 KY. L.J. 259, 273–74 (1996) (stating that although the
Near Court’s articulation of a narrow exception was incredibly vague, it certainly left open
some possibility for an exception to the prior restraint jurisprudence based on interests of
national security).

192

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:171

Thus, a prior restraint on DURC publications may find its place in this apparent
realm of unspecified application of threats deemed to cause “direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to [the] Nation.”176 Progressive will help shed further light on
what instances the courts may be inclined to apply this language in allowing prior
restraints on particularly harmful publications.177
3. Applying the DURC Issue to United States v. Featherston
From the outset, it is important to recognize that Featherston is not a civil case
in which the court articulated its finding under a prior restraint analysis.178 Rather
this court affirmed the convictions of the two defendants in question by looking
purely at the legislation in question179 and whether the statute itself violated the defendants’ free speech rights.180 However, Featherston still provides a useful insight
into how some courts have sought to guard against the proliferation of scientific or
technical information that poses a potential threat to national security.181
Most pertinent to this Note is the manner in which the court articulated the “clear
and present danger” test to the facts before it.182 The court found that the actions of
the Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) were not constitutionally protected by
the First Amendment.183 The Fifth Circuit made this determination for a number of
reasons.184 Particularly important to the Circuit’s opinion was “that BAMM was a
‘cohesive and organized group . . . [consisting of] a force regularly trained in explosives and incendiary devices,’” that “oral testimony revealed that the members
of BAMM were told to have the ingredients necessary to configure incendiary
devices in their homes in order to prepare for the ‘coming revolution,’” and that
“[m]embers were also told to be ready to use the devices ‘at a moments notice.’”185
With all of this being considered, however, there was simply no testimony to
suggest that the revolution the defendants were preparing for had a concrete and
176

N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See infra Section II.B.4.
178
See United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1120–23 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming the
criminal conviction of two defendants after finding the statutory grounds for the convictions
were not unduly vague nor ran afoul of the free speech clause of the First Amendment), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
179
18 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1) (West 1994).
180
Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1120–21.
181
See Bhagwat, supra note 80, at 31 (“Featherston . . . could easily have been placed within
the category of scientific and technical facts—indeed, Featherston might even be considered
a case involving military secrets.”).
182
Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1122–23.
183
See id. at 1121–23.
184
Id.
185
R.J. Larizza, Paranoia, Patriotism, and the Citizen Militia Movement: Constitutional
Right or Criminal Conduct?, 47 MERCER L. REV. 581, 627 (1996) (quoting Featherston, 461
F.2d at 1122).
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immediately forthcoming start date.186 The militant movement, though providing
technical instructions for future acts of terrorism, did not “set a specific date,” it did
not specify exact actions that the movement was planning to take, and it did not
articulate any “specific target[ ].”187
All of this is referenced to show that the “clear and present danger” that the
Featherston court was concerned with, was not necessarily an imminent one.188 The
Fifth Circuit suggested in this case that the First Amendment does not protect
speech—or more specifically—instructions that pose a certain kind of threat, even
if that threat is simply speculative at the time.189
I again want to recognize that this is not a prior restraint case, but rather one in
which the constitutionality of a criminal statute was considered by the court.190
Additionally, the type of speech at hand in Featherston was considered to be “crimefacilitating speech,” as there was truly only one purpose for it—to encourage civil
disobedience and destruction.191 This should be juxtaposed with dual use research
of concern, which, by its nature, cannot be considered to have solely a criminal
purpose.192 For these reasons, the case is not directly on point with any potential
calls for prior restraint to be placed on dual use research of concern publications.
However, I believe the holding of the Fifth Circuit in Featherston still helps
support an argument in favor of prior restraints on the publication of dual use research of concern. If the courts are willing to entertain situations in which First
Amendment protections are waived due to the potential threat that the speech poses,
then the opportunity for prior restraints in a DURC context may stand up to judicial
scrutiny. The fact that the court was still willing to support a statute that chilled the
defendants’ free speech rights, despite there being no particularly imminent attack
or even a specified target, helps support the idea that a similar rationale could be
186

See id.
Id. at 628.
188
Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1122 (“The words ‘clear and present danger’ do not require that
the government await the fruition of planned illegal conduct of such nature as is here involved.”).
189
See Larizza, supra note 185, at 628 n.189 (“Arguably, violent acts resulting from training
BAMM members in the making of explosive devices could have been months or even years
away based on the equivocal statement ‘we must get our heads and minds and bodies right
for the revolution, no telling when the revolution might come.’”) (quoting Featherston, 461
F.2d at 1123 n.4).
190
Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1120–21.
191
Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1366,
1375–76 (2016).
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Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC), U. CALIF. IRVINE OFF. OF RESEARCH, http://
www.research.uci.edu/ref/durc/index.html [http://perma.cc/P945-CHWD] (last visited Oct. 16,
2019) (“[DURC] . . . is life sciences research that . . . can be reasonably anticipated to provide
knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose
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applied to the type of indeterminate threat posed by the dissemination of dual use
research of concern.193
4. Applying the DURC Issue to United States v. Progressive
Progressive, though useful in analyzing how at least one court has handled the
publication of dual use research of concern, has not necessarily been well-received194
and its reasoning was never reviewed by a higher court.195 In fact, the government
dismissed the case just three days after oral argument in front of the Seventh Circuit.196 For these reasons, I do not suggest that the opinion should be viewed as any
form of binding precedent, or even a necessarily persuasive case for future courts to
rely on. That said, I find it important to explore the reasoning of the District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin for the primary reason that it is one of the few,
if not the only, courts that have explored the issue of prior restraints being placed on
DURC publications (though the court never explicitly considered the issue as such).197
It is important to draw parallels between the actual information that was to be
published in Progressive with the type of information that is associated with dual
use research of concern. In Progressive, the court was concerned with the publication of technical information that could be used for nefarious purposes, writing
193

One of the common criticisms of imposing restraints on the publication of dual use research of concern is the idea that it is nearly impossible to measure the probability of an attack,
or the causation between the publication of DURC and mal-intentioned applications of that
information. See, e.g., Michael J. Imperiale & Arturo Casadevall, A New Synthesis for Dual Use
Research of Concern, 12 PLOS MED. 1, 3–4 (2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosmedi
cine/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001813&type=printable [http://perma.cc/HK3B
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calls for rejection of injunction claims like those advanced by the Government in the Progressive case.”); Williams, supra note 16, at 364 (“The ensuing court case [Progressive], and
what happened while the case was pending, illustrates the law’s inadequacy to deal with
threats posed by publication of DURC that is in private hands.”).
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Williams, supra note 16, at 364.
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Masur, supra note 106, at 1349.
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specifically that “this Court concludes that publication of the technical information
on the hydrogen bomb contained in the article is analogous to publication of troop
movements or locations in time of war and falls within the extremely narrow exception to the rule against prior restraint.”198 Arguably, this information could have
also been used in the name of expanding scientific understanding, just as dual use
research of concern seeks to do with publications regarding life sciences research.199
The court’s opinion, while recognizing the heavy presumption against prior
restraint in American jurisprudence, ultimately feared the dangers of thermonuclear
annihilation more than it feared the necessary chilling effect on free speech protections for the publisher.200 In other words, “the district court placed ‘the right to life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ above the freedom of the press in its ‘hierarchy
of values.’”201 Prior restraint on dual use research of concern, as has previously been
argued in this Note, finds its justification on these grounds for national security.
The threat of ill-intentioned bioterrorist application of DURC, as the threat of
“thermonuclear annihilation”202 in Progressive, is incredibly grave, and its impact
on society’s well-being cannot be understated.203 While a fear of global, thermonuclear proliferation is not merely a relict of the Cold War,204 the fears have at least
changed to encompass the threat of bioterrorism as well.205 This modern threat, with
its cataclysmic potential, should be considered in the same manner as the threat of
nuclear annihilation was considered by the Progressive.
198
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202
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. at 995 (“What is involved here is information dealing
with the most destructive weapon in the history of mankind, information of sufficient destructive potential to nullify the right to free speech and to endanger the right to life itself.”).
203
See supra Section II.A.
204
Jonathan Hunt, Why the Arms Race Is Still White Hot Decades After the Cold War
Ended—and How to Stop It, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com
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CONCLUSION
Freedom of speech, and particularly freedom from censorship, is necessary for
the functioning of an ordered democracy. It ensures that the represented people will
have an avenue to voice their concerns and criticisms of the government without
having to resort to revolution. It allows a multitude of ideas and expressions to be
considered in the marketplace of ideas. And, pertinent to this Note, it helps facilitate
the advancement of knowledge, which one would hope to be used exclusively for
beneficial purposes. The First Amendment’s unique importance in American governance is exemplified by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Near: “In determining
the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally,
considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints
upon publication.”206
However, not all speech is for benevolent purposes, and even when such expression is well-intentioned, it can still lead to unforeseen, harmful circumstances. It is
for this reason that not all speech is protected, and it is arguably the reason that the
Supreme Court has articulated certain instances where prior restraints on publication
are permitted. It is in the context of these articulated exceptions, namely the exception for national security, that an argument can be made for constitutionally permissible prior restraints being placed on the publication of dual use research of concern.
While recognizing the immense importance of free speech protections, the threat
that unregulated DURC publication poses is immense. Although it is far from clear
that outright restraints are the best way to address the threat, or even a particularly
practical way to address it, its sensibleness should be explored, free from the idea
that all prior restraints are immediately violative of the First Amendment.
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